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2013/06/27 : CIA-RDP80R01580R002004220051-8

MEMORANDUM FOR: Walt

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Please see my note to DDCI below  
and his okay of the suggestion made.

HK

DCI/ 

6/28/65

(DATE)

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**OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR**

**DDCI:**

There is some concern (to me) in this since DCI, without USIB advice and concurrence, speaks for USIB. But the Agency feels it essential to preserve community control of satellite launches and what is said squares with previous USIB views.

Further, the last para opens the door for further COMOR/USIB consideration of the questions raised by NRO.

Do believe, however, that copies of this correspondence should be circulated to USIB members for info.

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16 JUL 1965

**MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, National Reconnaissance Office**

**SUBJECT : Requirements for Present Satellite  
Image-Forming Sensors**

1. I have read with interest your memorandum of 16 June. Your summary of the USIB requirements is essentially accurate and I believe your plans as described are likely to meet the needs of the intelligence community as established by USIB. As you know, no one can predict with precision even the short term world situation and the associated intelligence needs. For this reason we must maintain scheduling flexibility rather than falling into rigid patterns.

2. As guiding principles to our satellite collection efforts, the following must continue to apply:

a. USIB, taking into account the existing priority needs, the collection potential of a mission, and within the operational restraints, will approve specific mission launch dates within a time frame of a few days.

b. USIB will furnish, through the COMSAR and its working groups, mission-to-mission guidance on the specific tasks to be performed based on evaluations of the current priorities for intelligence information.

c. USIB will consider data from previous missions both in launch date selection and in specific tasking. Thus, the time between launches will normally be adequate to prevent redundant coverage and to exploit most efficiently the expensive collection efforts.

3. I shall continue to task COMSAR to keep the USIB informed of the status of our collection efforts against both the long and short term requirements.

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(signed) W. F. Raborn

**W. F. RABOLD**

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DDI/CGS/Reconnaissance Group

(22 June 1965)

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**Distribution:**

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Copy #1 & 2 - Addressee

# 3 - Signer

# 4 - ER

# 5 - DD/I *w/basic*

# 6 - DD/HIFE

# 7 - DD/SMT

# 8 - Chairman, COMOR

# 9 - USIB Secretariat (Mr. Lav)

#10 - IG Staff

#11 - DD/SMT

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18 JUN 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Principles for the Guidance of the Satellite  
Reconnaissance Program

1. This memorandum contains a recommendation in paragraph 4 concerning the attached memorandum from you to Dr. McMillan.
2. As you are aware, Mr. McCone and USIB have addressed themselves a number of times to the guidance of the National Reconnaissance Program and have evolved several principles with regard to this guidance. In general these principles make provision for ensuring continuing satisfaction of USIB priority intelligence needs on a best cost/effectiveness basis.
3. I believe these principles are wise and worthy to be preserved and frequently reaffirmed. They represent a fine balance between needs for information from photography and responsibility in guiding the costly photo reconnaissance effort. The critical point is that this effort must continue to be directed in the last instance by the intelligence community under your authority and not by the operators of the program.
4. In view of the foregoing, it is appropriate to respond to Dr. McMillan's 16 June memorandum in the light of the established and approved USIB principles and thereby avert revival of all the previous arguments over control and management of mission programming. Therefore, I recommend that you sign and forward to Dr. McMillan the attached memorandum which points out that you endorse the existing USIB procedures, for continuous USIB review and guidance to the NRO through the COMOR, rather than only a bi-monthly USIB review of progress as proposed in the last paragraph of Dr. McMillan's memorandum.

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RAY C. CLINE

Deputy Director (Intelligence)

Attachment

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CONCUR:

Deputy to the DCI for NIPE

Date 21 June 1965

CONCUR:

Deputy Director (Science and Technology)

Date 22 June 65

CONCUR:

Chairman, COMOR

Date June 18, 1965

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY

16 JUN 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, USIB

SUBJECT: Requirements for Present Satellite Image-Forming  
Sensors

Reference is made to USIB-D-41.14/229, as approved at the 24 March and 14 April USIB meetings.

I have deferred the NRO's response to this document for several weeks, in anticipation of early receipt from the COMOR of specific target decks for the KH-4/KH-7 surveillance objectives. These decks have not yet been received. I understand that some adjustments are being made in the priorities and frequencies set forth in Tab A of the basic paper which will delay still further COMOR's assembly of the detailed target requirements.

Because of the relatively long lead times associated with the manufacture and preparation of payloads, spacecraft, and boosters, the NRO had to make reasonably firm and final program and budgetary decisions for FY 1966 approximately six months ago. Fortunately, it was possible to base those decisions to a large degree on NRO analyses of the draft predecessors to 41.14/229. We understand informally that the adjustments now being contemplated to Tab A of that document do not change the KH-4 requirements but may increase the KH-7 requirements somewhat. In either case, the NRO appears to be in a position to respond to USIB's needs in the year ahead.

The purpose of this memorandum is to apprise the Board of the basic KH-4 and KH-7 launch programs the NRO will undertake in FY 66 in response to the requirements of 41.14/229. This basic program should fulfill a large majority of the stated search and surveillance requirements. As will be noted, some reserve of KH-4 and KH-7 systems will also be available should the requirements increase or unforeseen emergencies arise.

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Copy 1 of 9  
Page 1 of 4  
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Prior to describing the launch program, let me first commend the COMOR on their product. This document represents the first comprehensive set of KH-4 and KH-7 requirements ever compiled, and it should be most helpful both to the NRO and the Intelligence Community. It provides a firm basis, long needed, on which the NRO can plan and conduct an orderly and efficient operational program to meet USIB's needs. I am sure it will also be most useful to the USIB in its continuing assessment of intelligence requirements and accomplishments.

There follow specific comments on various portions of D-41.14/229 and a brief description of the operational program the NRO will pursue in Fiscal Year 1966 toward the stated requirements.

#### Search and Surveillance (KH-4):

Based upon past experience and NRO operational analyses, I generally share the COMOR view that about 10 "successful" KH-4 missions devoted to the purpose will fulfill a large majority of the recurring search and surveillance requirements in the Sino-Soviet Bloc. To achieve the equivalent of 10 "successful" missions should require approximately 12 KH-4 launches during the twelve month period. It is necessary to speak in terms of equivalents, since past experience has shown that some of the missions will be only partial successes in that they will not achieve their planned lifetimes on orbit.

The NRO therefore has scheduled twelve KH-4 launches in FY 1966. To optimize returns, the launches should occur at approximately one month intervals in the Summer, be more closely spaced in the Spring and Fall (to take advantage of favorable weather west of the Urals and in South China, respectively, in those periods), and be more widely spaced in the December-January period (because of low illumination, relatively high cloud cover, snow obscuration of target details, etc). The December and June launches should be considered as tentative, at this time, and the final decision to launch them should depend upon the results of the preceding launches in that six month period. Throughout the year, one

KH-4 system will be available at an R-7 status, for use either in a crisis situation or as a back-up to a total mission failure in one of the twelve regularly scheduled launches.

Mapping and Charting (KH-4):

Besides the twelve search and surveillance KH-4's discussed above, two additional KH-4's have been allocated against the stated mapping and charting requirements. The launch schedule for these two missions will be established at a later date; however, for planning purposes, we assume one launch this Fall and the second next Spring.

As a matter of interest, the Pan Reseau modification will be flown early in CY 1966. If this capability is as successful as anticipated, it should improve the mapping, charting, and geodesy from regular KH-4 missions without degrading the quality of search/surveillance photography.

Technical Surveillance (KH-7):

Based upon experience to date in the program, I estimate that approximately 12 launches will be required to achieve the equivalent of the "nine successful missions" described in 41.14/229. As previously discussed in the KH-4 section of this memorandum, in terms of active days on orbit, the sum of the completely and partially successful missions should equate to approximately nine complete successes.

The NRO therefore has scheduled twelve KH-7 launches in FY 1966. The launches will be spaced at fairly even intervals throughout the year in a manner similar to that previously described for the KH-4 system, with the December and June launches tentative and dependent upon the results of the preceding five missions in that six month period.

Standby KH-4 and KH-7 Missions:


A requirement is stated in USIB 14/229 that additional KH-4 and KH-7 vehicles should be available to meet periods of international tension.

This requirement will be met without difficulty in the KH-4 program. A modest "reserve" has been acquired, and five to six systems are continually in preparation somewhere between R-38 and R-0. As many as six systems could be launched in a two month period, and lead times are such that a two-per-month rate could be continued almost indefinitely. At least one KH-4 system is in an R-7 status at all times. Further, the KH-4 has demonstrated its capability to hold in an R-1 status for reasonably long intervals.

In the case of the KH-7, we will not enter the new fiscal year with much reserve on hand. Fifteen systems will be delivered during the year, of which only twelve have been allocated to the basic launch program. Normally, a continuous R-7 capability is not maintained with the KH-7 system, but there always will be one system at the launch site at approximately R-14 or less. In emergencies, a launch rate of two per month can be maintained for three or more months. The KH-7 can be held in an R-1 status for 10-14 days if needed during periods of crisis.

Program Progress During the Year:

The NRO will follow the program outlined above starting 1 July (essentially, we are on such a schedule now). In this regard, it is urged that the target decks for 14/229 be completed and forwarded to the NRO as soon as possible. It is further suggested that, at approximately two month intervals throughout the year, the Board review NRO progress toward meeting the search, surveillance, and technical surveillance requirements.

  
Brockway McMillan  
Director  
National Reconnaissance Office

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